It’s a collaborative blog I’ve put up with the help of some friends. We intend it to be a source of thought-provoking analyses on social and cultural issues, political and economic developments, and other relevant trends. We want it to be wide-ranging, inclusive of all ideas, intellectual but never patronizing. We envision it to provide ideas that, in the words of some of this blog’s esteemed readers, combine “the applied practicality” of journalism with “the intellectual nuance” of the academe, and “un-insular in their breadth and scope.” We also hope to attract others to add to the discourse by posting comments and contributing articles.

As of press time, we’ve published five articles:

President Poe in 2016?
Taiwan and the Philippines: Ma’s Bewildering Tantrum
Hashimoto, Comfort Women, and Why Japan Is Not Sorry Enough
Taiwan and the Philippines: Aquino’s Heel
Japan, Germany, and the Politics of Apology

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Kim shows off at great cost.

Observers may differ on what motivates North Korea’s current saber-rattling, but they generally agree on one thing: No matter how crazy Kim Jong-un might appear to be, he’s not irrational. He and his clique know that an all-out war on the peninsula is theirs to lose. Therefore, it’s not their intention to spark actual war.

North Korea’s actions, belligerent as they are, follow a logical line of thinking, the premise of which is the assumption that the country’s neighbors value stability so much they would always find it better to pay Pyongyang off than risk military conflict. Such a conflictcould mean the derailment of President Vladimir Putin’s economic plans in the Russian Far East for Moscow, economic nightmares for Seoul and Tokyo, and destabilizing flow of refugees and geopolitical risks for Beijing. True enough, during the last decade, the regional powers had been so preoccupied with the preservation of the present geopolitical calculus that they grudgingly put up with the late Dear Leader Kim Jong-il’s racket.

Like his father, Kim Jong-un operates on a similar set of assumptions, too, and these assumptions give him reason to believe that no matter how provocative he sets out to be, all out war on the peninsula– and therefore the complete annihilation of his regime– will remain unlikely.

For instance, it appears that Kim has a couple of assumptions about South Korea and the United States. On one hand, the city of Seoul is the political, economic, and cultural nerve center of South Korea, and it is located dangerously close to the 38th parallel. While South Korea and the United States have immense military advantage over the North, the capital is indefensible against North Korean missiles and artillery. Kim, therefore, is probably counting on the assumption that no South Korean president will risk exposing the city to North Korean attacks.  On the other hand, I suspect that President Barack Obama’s “strategic patience” policy towards North Korea has been interpreted differently by Pyongyang. Kim probably thinks that the United States has become so preoccupied with its domestic and economic concerns that it now has neither the will nor the means to pursue sustained military conflict against the hermit country.

As far as Kim is concerned, these assumptions have been tested in 2010, when North Korea torpedoed the South Korean warship Cheonan and shelled the South Korean island of Yeongpyeon. At that time, South Korea– under the hawkish President Lee Myung-bak no less– and the United States did practically nothing in response to North Korean violations not only of the Armistice but also of the United Nations Charter. But while Pyongyang sees this as a sign of weakness of the two allies, Seoul and Washington probably see this as the red line: Do that again, and we will forcefully respond.

Indeed, this is exactly the message Seoul and Washington are sending. The two allies have come up with an unprecedented joint war plan to counter North Korean provocations. I understand that joint military exercises are being conducted with more frequency, and that the United States has been stationing more air and naval assets to the peninsula as well. Some American commentators, however, worry that this message might be interpreted differently in Beijing, which has a strategic interest in keeping the North Korean buffer state intact– an interest that forms the basis of Kim’s other assumption, which is that, if push comes to shove, he can count on China’s support.

But as Prof. W. Scott Thompson wrote on his New Straits Times column last Thursday, “China is fed up with Kim’s antics and won’t bail North Korea out if it miscalculates.” Indeed, this early, the Chinese have been sternly telling the North Koreans to behave, just as I have predicted they would in a previous blog entry. Beijing, for instance, signed up on a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning Pyongyang’s recent missile launch, its foreign minister joining the international chorus of condemnation against North Korea. It had sternly warned its junior ally against rattling its saber before that. And then there’s this unprecedented debate among Chinese officials and intellectuals on whether the country should abandon its junior ally or not.

It is true that China wants to keep the North Korean buffer state intact, but this has to be balanced against the Middle Kingdom’s other strategic interests. Kim’s behavior has given the United States much strategic capital vis a vis China. The threat of war gives the Americans all the justifications they need to increase their presence in the region, and for all we know the said increase is directed not against North Korea– which Washington seems to see merely as a minor threat, if at all– but against China. Moreover, Kim’s threat might make it easier for the notoriously hawkish Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to re-militarize his country, which would of course get in the way of China’s attempt to challenge the status-quo in the East China Sea.

As far as the Chinese are concerned, therefore, Kim has got to stop. If he doesn’t, they might begin to hit him where it hurts: His hoards in Shanghai banks. The United States is already trying to pull the necessary levers to push China to do just that, and as Prof. Thompson said, “though Beijing might be slow to choke, its force would be inexorable.”

Kim is not irrational, alright; but he doesn’t seem to be very smart, either. His saber-rattling has just cost him the confidence of his most important ally. Give it a few more miscalculations and it might cost him his own life.

I’m also on Twitter.

Watching his back: Kim Jong -un.

Like all secluded totalitarian states, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is very difficult to read. Information emanating from that hermit country is very scarce; hence, whatever political analysis experts come up with are often based on nothing more than reasonable conjectures.

In the past few days, the United States and the Asian neighborhood have once again been abuzz with the recent bellicose rhetoric coming from Pyongyang. There are those, like the editors of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, who think that North Korea’s saber-rattling is a result of paranoia common to many authoritarian regimes. It would seem, however, that the prevailing opinion is that all-out war remains unlikely, and that the escalation of tensions is merely an exercise of tactical brinkmanship on Pyongyang’s part. The general analysis is that this is just a way for the North Korean regime to test the mettle of the newly-installed administration of South Korean President Park Geun-hye, and to consolidate its bargaining position in order to leverage for foreign aid. I generally agree with this prevailing view, but my opinion has a slightly different nuance.

North Korea is unique in the sense that it’s probably the only country in the world that experiences famine after undergoing industrialization. It started out with an economy much bigger than South Korea’s during the early post-war period, but its government stubbornly pursued Songun, or military-first policy, at the expense of building adequate infrastructure that could have facilitated growth in the agricultural sector and other industries. Making matters worse, the Democratic People’s Republic shunned post-war international trade and, during the 1970s, lost access to credits after it defaulted on its enormous foreign debt, much of which had been used to fund the regime’s many wasteful white elephants. Deprived of a steady source of foreign exchange, North Korea has been treating foreign aid as a form of income since then.

This is why the regime of the late Dear Leader Kim Jong-il used the country’s nuclear weapons program as a leverage to gain aid, cleverly escalating tensions every now and then to extort concessions from Japan, South Korea, and the United States. There’s no doubt that his son, Kim Jong-un, sees saber-rattling as a way to gain “income” too, and that part of the reason behind the on-going provocations is to do exactly that.

However, as I have consistently stated on this blog, the main motivation of Kim Jong-un– or more accurately the ruling clique that props him up, which is reportedly led by his uncle Chang Song-taek–  seems to be slightly different from that of his father’s: More than leverage for aid, the goal seems to be the consolidation of the boyish* dictator’s two-year rule. This probably explains why Kim went ahead with his satellite launch in March last year despite the fact that doing so entailed the cancellation of a generous American offer, painstakingly negotiated by his Foreign Ministry just the month before, of 240,000 tons of grains.

Political scientists would often tell us that to remain stable, regimes need political legitimacy, which is usually derived from electoral mandates. For autocratic countries, identifying sources of legitimacy is tricky, since there are no elections. In North Korea, for instance, being a Kim is not an automatic basis of legitimacy.  Kim Jong-il had to prove his worth: He worked as a senior official for ten years before succeeding his father, yet he still had to face at least one coup and consolidate his rule during the first few years of his term. In contrast, Kim Jong-un never had the experience his father had prior to taking the reins of government, and so it’s likely that his legitimacy in the eyes of the ruling elite has not yet been established. More that that, the ruling elite can only prop up the Kim dynasty for so long; sooner or later it would have to come up with something to reinforce its legitimacy in the eyes of the North Korean people, in the same manner that the Chinese Communist Party has taken to fanning nationalist flames to justify its rule.

Unlike his grandfather, the Eternal President Kim Il-sung, who hyped his wartime exploits, and his father Kim Jong-il, who encouraged popular mythology about his birth, Kim Jong-un seems to be humanizing his position to endear himself to his people. For instance, he has been regularly seen delivering speeches, sporting his gorgeous wife, and smiling in public– things his aloof predecessors never deemed worth doing. As he tries to reach out to his constituents in an apparent attempt to win genuine mandate, he seems to see the need to unify his subjects by invoking a foreign threat, and to show the ruling elite that, despite his smiling demeanor, he is as tough as his forebears. This seems to be his idea of gaining political legitimacy and keeping the elite in check; and, as we shall see in our next blog entry, it is not without great cost. The question is, are people in Pyongyang buying it?

I’m also on Twitter. 

*I’m calling Kim Jong-un a “boyish dictator”, but he’s in fact six or seven years older than I am. 

Anyone bold enough to bring the parade to the courts?

By JESUS FALCIS

NOTE: This is a guest post. It may or may not reflect my own views.

A week ago, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the constitutionality of Proposition 8, a California initiative amending the state constitution in 2008, and the Defense of the Marriage Act (DOMA), a federal law passed in 1996. Both laws restrict marriage to a man and a woman.

In the Philippines, the Family Code, issued by President Corazon Aquino in 1987 when she still had legislative powers, defines marriage as a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. However, the Constitution defines marriage merely as an inviolable social institution and as the foundation of the family.

During the oral arguments in the United States, advocates of marriage equality argued that Prop 8 and DOMA were unconstitutional because there is no substantial distinction between heterosexual marriages and homosexual marriages in furthering the state’s interest. They argued that the purpose of marriage is not pro-creative, as the Christian lobby argues, since sterile opposite-sex couples and couples who do not have children are allowed to marry. They invoked the Equal Protection clause.

The Philippine Constitution has a similar clause under Article III Section 1 of the Bill of Rights. It states that “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” The Philippine Supreme Court has adopted a four-fold test in determining the validity of laws under this Equal Protection clause. The classification must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

Thus, laws that restrict marriage between a man and a woman create two classifications: opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples. It must be remembered that same-sex relationships are not prohibited by law, since that would be unconstitutional for violating the right to privacy and liberty. Since gay couples are free to enter into a relationship, it must be asked why they are not free to marry.

A decision from the US Supreme Court striking down gay marriage bans, which might come out around June or July, will only help a similar case in the Philippines. Local politicians and religious groups would be hard-pressed to find a legitimate government interest to ban gays from marrying, as has been shown by the oral arguments in the United States. There, the Justices have asked skeptical questions about pro-creation being the state’s interest in regulating marriage.

Justice Elena Kagan even pointed out that the passage of DOMA was driven by an animus, or intent to discriminate, against gays. She read out loud in session a portion of the House Report, which said that DOMA was meant to reflect the Congress’s “collective moral judgment and to express moral disapproval of homosexuality.”

But while legal arguments against gay marriage bans in the Philippines are easy to make and would be highly persuasive, the country is still far away from a Prop 8 or DOMA debate. For Philippine courts to have an opportunity to strike down the Family Code for being unconstitutional, there must be an actual case or controversy.

There would have to be a gay couple brave and willing enough to put themselves in the limelight. The said couple would have to apply for a marriage license at the Civil Registrar, be denied such application, then hire a lawyer, file a case, and be exposed to intense media and public scrutiny– perhaps even be featured in a Catholic poster called “Team Beki”.

Any takers?

Jesus Falcis is pursuing a Juris Doctor degree at the University of the Philippines Diliman.

Want to contribute articles for the Guest Post? Just indicate in the blog’s comment section.

I’m also on Twitter. 

Peace for our time: Is this the last chapter of violence in the Bangsamoro?

By BORIS C. LUNA

NOTE: This is a guest post. It may or may not reflect my own views.

President Benigno S. Aquino III has spoken out against conspirators as the ones at fault in the violence in Sabah. He has threatened to charge Jamalul Kiram, pretender to the throne of the defunct Sultanate of Sulu, for his actions that caused his followers to invade Sabah to assert the ancient claim of his family to the vast territory.

But is it really about the Kirams? Is it about the claim to Sabah? Is it about Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo? Or is this incident merely a product of the traditional myopia of successive Philippine administrations, sacrificing long-term perspective for political expediency in developing policy?

Peace Framework for Continued Violence

The government of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has sought peace with the MILF as one of its cornerstone policies. To this end, it signed a Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domains with the MILF that served as the capitulation of the Philippine government to demands of the MILF to autonomy. This agreement was struck down by the Supreme Court, and thus President Aquino was able to present the 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro as his own legacy of peace in Mindanao.

This policy followed by two successive governments, and the Ramos government before them, was a vindication of the method of armed rebellion chosen by the MILF as its instrument of forcing policy change in the government. It was incongruous that the government chose to accede to peace talks when the stated goal of the MILF was not independence, but rather a substate. That is rather unusual for an armed rebel group, who usually ask for independence and then concede to autonomy. Given that they already demanded autonomy, then it means that the MILF conceded recognition of the legal mandate of the government of the Philippines over the lands they claim and thus its subordination to Philippine laws. Even criminals who do not bother themselves to think of the legal mandate of the government are still prosecuted and then incarcerated, so why didn’t the government respond to MILF acts of violence with vigorous police action?

Even more curious, the government can recognize their grievances by simply encouraging them to participate in the ARMM elections. The ARMM has enough power to change its own system if the MILF’s endorsed candidates can win and implement their proposals within the already existing framework. The fact that the government entered into peace talks with the MILF and then decided to reorganize the autonomy of Muslim Mindanao based on these talks has shown a picture of government concession to violence. Even worse, it was the government agreeing that its own laws and structures, built with legitimacy derived from elections and plebiscites, are insufficient and can be changed only with violent action against such institutions.

This framework also nullified the loyalty shown by many Muslim Filipinos who did not participate in the MILF revolt. They fought with the Republic against the rebels, but ultimately they would live under a government crafted to the wishes of the rebels. This does not count the thousands of Filipino soldiers who died in defense of the same Republic, even as the MILF continued to flout its immunity from laws that bound all other citizens, such as the incident in Al-Barka. The framework’s contents might be valid, but their validity becomes irrelevant when the Constitution remained in force, and it was not respected by either the government or the MILF. Force has won over the law.

But then again, the 2012 Framework Agreement requires the MILF to participate in the electoral process. Does it not nullify the objections raised above? The answer is no. It might require voter approval, but then again the government has already shown its support for the MILF position. What happens if voters reject the framework agreement? Does the MILF go back to the hills? If yes, then what was the reason for the peace talks to begin with? If not, then why should we let the MILF’s decision to rebel slide? Other groups take to Constitutionally protected forms of political agitation, but why is the MILF special? Why are they getting away with violating the Constitution?

Incomprehensibly, even if the argument boiled down to force, there was no reason for the government to concede. Erap has proven that the AFP can defeat the MILF. The fact that the MILF could not even bluster for the rest of his abbreviated term showed that the power of the MILF has been broken, and it can only crumble in the face of sustained assaults from the AFP and PNP. The lull afforded by the peace talks allowed the MILF to establish camps and settlements that it was not able to win by force of arms. And they immediately showed their contempt for Philippine laws inside those enclaves.

As violence continued, the MILF claimed “lost commands” when it suited them to deny responsibility. Given that they cannot control their own troops, or at least they cannot guarantee complete peace even after all concessions granted by the government, there was no reason to sign the framework, but sign the government did.

And so at the end of the day, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front had its way. By exploiting talk of peace, it was able to gain government support for enforcing their way of life on people who never voted for them, in territories they could never win by force of arms. And those who remained loyal to the government and the democratic process looked on.

The Kiram Dynasty

The Kiram Dynasty once ruled over Sulu, Palawan, Tawi-Tawi, Sabah, and various other islands that comprised the Sultanate of Sulu. The Sultan of Sulu’s warriors plundered coastal villages under the rule of Spain, carting off slaves to be sold in the slave markets of Borneo.

But as time passed by, the Sultanate’s fortunes began to wane. Battered by continuous wars, the Sultan had to submit to the King of Spain in 1881, and to the Americans in 1916. To his credit, the Sultan became a Filipino, never again challenging the authority of the Americans  of the Philippine Republic. Indeed, one of his kin was a member of the 1935 Constitutional Commission.

But now, Jamalul Kiram III saw himself becoming sidelined in Mindanao affairs. Although the Sultan of Sulu hasn’t mattered that much for some time, it is probable that poverty and old age is driving him to more desperate measures. The government did promise to honor the Sultan as a spiritual leader of the Moros. The government also promised to uphold and protect the claim over Sabah.

And he has become so irrelevant that even his letter to the President was not deemed worthy of the personal attention of Pnoy. Now left with the pittance that is the annual rent, and facing competing claims over the title of Sultan, he has most likely seen how the MILF, and before them, the MNLF, achieve power and respect from the government through force. And so perhaps he was approached by opposition forces from both the Philippines and Malaysia, perhaps not. But one thing is clear – he had nothing to lose from the venture and everything to gain.

As inflation continued to erode the value of the annual rent and the government continued to express indifference over the Sabah claim, he has fallen far, but can still fall some more.

It is not clear if he actually thought he can invade Sabah and win, or if it was even his intention. But what is clear is that people now consider him Sultan of Sulu and he has obviated the legitimacy of the claims of other people, if only by the standard of being referred to as sultan both in the media and private conversations. He has also succeeded in forcing the government to take another look at the Sabah claim and consider its status.

And most importantly, his letter to the President was miraculously found and read by its intended recipient. And that is what violence brought Kiram.

The Post-Conflict Scenario

The Philippines has long had a history of revolts against the government, even after colonization. The Pulahanes revolted against the Commonwealth, there was the Huk rebellion, the NPA, the MNLF, the MILF, RAM, Kato’s Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, and recently, the Magdalo. The question is, why, given the liberal democratic tradition of this country, are revolts so frequent? It becomes even more incongruous considering that not a single one of these revolts has been successful. So many people have tried and failed, but still rebels can be found popping out every so often.

Is it the oppressive nature of the government? Perhaps, but Leftist propaganda to the contrary, the Philippine government has never reached the level of oppression seen in Myanmar, even during the Marcos dictatorship. In addition, the Armed Forces of the Philippines has generally had a successful run against these insurgents. Even in the 1980s, when the AFP had to deal with the NPA, MILF, and MNLF all at the same time while combating putschists in its own ranks, the government was not overwhelmed and engulfed. Not one of these rebellions managed to threaten the government center the way the Huks did in the late 1940s. And the Huks were still beaten off. As a disincentive to revolt, this run of success is a pretty powerful one.

Why do rebels continue to risk their lives when a revolt is unlikely to succeed and when it is easier to go to Manila and just picket government offices? It is because violence works. Kiram’s case is unique in the sense that the violence was not directed against the national government, but it is still violence that got results.

The rebels might not have achieved their stated goals, but their resort to violence was rewarded. Joma Sison continues to live in comfort in the Netherlands and can lay claim to belligerency even as the NPA has been reduced to acts of banditry in the countryside. Honasan of RAM and Trillanes of Magdalo are now Senators. Misuari of the MNLF got ARMM before he revolted against the government once more. The MILF is about to get their peace treaty. And none of them had to account for their crimes to the Filipino people.

In the future, another citizen with grievances against the government might consider what happened all this, and once more eschew legal and institutional frameworks for agitating for reforms. The government should consider the costs of seeking peace in dealing with those who use violence to circumvent the legal process.

Boris C. Luna is a friend I’ve often invited to contribute to this blog. He is very interested in national security issues.

Want to contribute articles for the Guest Post? Just indicate in the blog’s comment section.

I’m also on Twitter. 

The Prime Minister and the spare tire.

A week before the Philippines achieved its first investment grade status, credit ratings agency Fitch upgraded Thailand’s ratings three notches higher than non-investment levels. The said upgrades were in recognition of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s ability to maintain political stability just a couple of years after divisions created by his brother Thaksin almost succeeded in tearing Thailand apart.

A farang expert on Thai politics once described Thaksin as a Thai Mussolini. The erstwhile mogul and former police chief built a patronage system that rivals that of the monarchy’s. His strong support base, composed mostly of the rural poor in the kingdom’s Isan region, made him a formidable alternative power pole to King Bhumibol Adulyadej‘s circle. His populist economic policy– dubbed by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as Thaksinomics– gave Thailand its first economic turn-around since the Asian Financial Crisis; but his tenure was marked with alleged corruption, human rights abuses, and authoritarian tendencies. In 2006, he was ousted in a military coup that was widely believed to have been engineered by the President of His Majesty’s Privy Council, General Prem Tinsunalonda.

Since then, Thailand has been in a protracted political war between the Thaksinite forces and their Red Shirt street army on one hand, and the coalition among the Palace, the royalist mandarins that make up the ammart and their allies in the military, the Bangkok elite, and the Yellow Shirt middle class activists on the other.

When the post-Thaksin junta was forced to call for elections in 2007, the Thaksinites succeeded in getting Samak Sundaravej to rule as Prime Minister on Thaksin’s behalf. The ammart responded by having him impeached for appearing in his cooking show on TV. Just the same, the Thaksinites replaced him with Thaksin’s brother-in-law, Somchai Wongsawat, prompting the royalists to resort to a judicial coup: The Constitutional Court had Prime Minister Somchai and the pro-Thaksin People’s Power Party banned from politics, and the military brokered an anti-Thaksin minority government led by British-born Abhisit Vejjajiva. Meanwhile, Red Shirt and Yellow Shirt protests became a constant sight on the streets of Bangkok, culminating in destructive occupations of public buildings like the Suvharnabumi Airport and violent riots that, at one point, caused the evacuation of heads of state in town for a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The ruckus subsided with the landslide election of Thaksin’s sister, the charming Yingluck, as premier in 2011. Aware of the enormous costs of the paralyzing street protests that embarrassed the kingdom and turned investors away, the Thaksinite forces and the Yellow coalition seemed to have agreed on what I’ve called on this blog as a testy truce, under which the Prime Minister and her allies would keep Thaksin abroad and the royalist order intact, and the army won’t launch a coup.

But Thaksin didn’t have to return to Thailand to rule. Observers marvel at how the fugitive ex-premier has employed the Internet to run the government in Bangkok: He presides over Cabinet meetings and give instructions to officials and members of the ruling Pheu Thai party through Skype, and holds court in Dubai and Hong Kong, summoning party leaders and receiving politicians eager to get Cabinet portfolios. Even the parliamentary debates on the controversial two-trillion-baht infrastructure bill is being supervised by the former prime minister via remote control.  As a result, Prime Minister Yingluck has taken to insisting, at almost every possible occasion, that she, not her brother, runs the government.

Meanwhile, political maneuverings continue. Every now and then the Thaksinite government would introduce bills that aim to change the military-imposed 2006 constitution and issue a blanket amnesty on all offenses prior to the coup, while the royalists would have the Constitutional Court thwart the said actions. Last year, in an interesting ploy, the Thaksinite forces had former Prime Minister Abhisit indicted for murder in connection with his government’s handling of the Red Shirt protests of 2009. It was obviously designed to get the opposition Democratic Party to support the blanket amnesty bill– after all, Abhisit, not just Thaksin, would benefit, too.

Perhaps in retaliation, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) started this month an inquiry into allegations that Prime Minister Yingluck had misdeclared her financial statement. The message from the ammart is clear: If we could boot Prime Minister Samak out of office for cooking on TV, we can boot Prime Minister Yingluck out over false financial statements, too. This is classic political brinkmanship, to which Thaksin won’t succumb: One of his minions, Kasem Nimmonrat of Chiang Mai, has resigned from parliament, paving the way for Thaksin’s other younger sister, Yaowapa Wongsawat, wife of former Prime Minister Somchai, to run for the seat.

Since Chiang Mai is a Thaksin bailiwick, Yaowapa will surely be in parliament by this month, ready to replace Yingluck should the NACC oust her.

I’m also on Twitter.

Doves, not pokemons.

In November, right after the President of the United States was re-elected, I wrote the essay “What Kind of President Would Obama Be?” In that piece, I drew on the works of professors Jack Balkin and Stephen Kowronek, the renowned scholar of American presidential history who classified his country’s presidents into four kinds: reconstructive, affiliated, pre-emptive, and disjunctive. The said essay elicited some reactions from both friends and readers, and at least a couple have asked if a similar classification of Philippine presidents can also be made.

Professor Kowronek’s classification describes a political cycle of creating and overturning dominant political regimes, which occur through a long period of time. Thus, it might not be applicable to the Philippine presidency, which has a relatively shorter history. At any rate, I don’t know all Philippine presidents well enough to come up with a similarly structured analysis of the entire Philippine presidential history. However– and I think this is obvious to all observers of Philippine politics– all five post-Edsa presidents seem to fit into only three different leadership templates, of which all students of Philippine politics should take note.

Almost exactly a year ago, Prof. Randy David articulated these three templates in a column on the Philippine Daily Inquirer.

The first template, wrote Professor David, is the moral leadership brand. It has a constituency that cuts across almost all social classes, projecting an ”image of a unified moral community” whose vision is “of a nation that can overcome the complex problems posed by corruption in government through the power of personal ethical example.” The figure of this template is, of course, the Aquino dynasty.

Ironically, the forebears of the Aquino name had not been noted originally for their “personal ethical examples.” They were seen merely as cunning politicians, not moral leaders. The original patriarch and the grandfather of the current president, the elder Benigno, was accused– unfairly, historians now agree– of treason because he worked with the Japanese during the Second World War. The more famous Benigno Jr., commonly known as Ninoy, meanwhile, was seen as an overly ambitious politician who, consumed by his desire to climb the stairs of Malacanang, slept with strange bedfellows until, says official history, imprisonment and exile turned him into the martyr that he was.

It was Ninoy’s widow, Corazon, who truly led by “personal ethical examples,” drawing mandate and political capital from her unassailable moral character. But while she successfully restored constitutional democracy and defended it from threats from the Right and the Left, she failed in terms of addressing poverty and inequality. Alas, that seems to be the limitation of the Aquino template: “Its approach to the problem of mass poverty,” says Professor David, “owes less to any structural analysis that prescribes redistribution than to the spirit of charity and sharing that leaves the unequal social order untouched.”

The second template, on the other hand, is the populist leadership brand, which presents a vision of “an inclusive society where no one gets left behind.” This brand draws its mandate and political capital from its ability to, firstly, validate the ways, and, secondly, articulate the hopes and frustrations– sometimes with dangerous rancor that invites class war– of the urban and rural poor, which it glorifies as the masa. Former President Joseph Estrada symbolizes this leadership brand, while Vice President Jejomar Binay, the strongest contender in the 2016 presidential elections, currently bears its banner.

Estrada, known by the masa affectionately as Erap, was the most maligned candidate in 1998. The Makati elite, the middle class, the Roman Catholic Church, and the mainstream media did everything they could to stop his rise to power, but to no avail. They had reasons for doing so: After six years of political stability and economic growth– the country was dubbed as an economic “tiger cub” ready for take-off– under President Fidel V. Ramos, the elite and the middle class doubted if movie star Erap, who never even had any pretensions to sophistication to begin with, could carry the torch onward. This concern was amplified by the eruption of the Asian Financial Crisis during the last few months of the Ramos administration.

The Catholic church, meanwhile, was scandalized by Erap’s philandering, gambling, and drunken lifestyle, and the fact that he was even flaunting it. But by making no apologies about his all-Filipino macho lifestyle, Erap was able to pass himself off as a genuine man of the masa. For some reasons, this kind of transparency– of not being a hypocrite who panders to the guardians of Catholic morality– appeals to the lower class. This probably explains why Vice President Binay, when confronted with rumors that he had an affair with another woman, readily admitted it, and, when asked if he is aiming for the presidency in 2016, made no effort to demure.

Erap’s strongest argument in 1998 was that, after six years of impressive economic growth that didn’t trickle down to the poor under President Ramos, the time had come for the masa to enjoy the fruits of an emerging economy. However, unlike Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand, who improved social services and economic livelihood for the rural poor of the Isan region, President Estrada, as far as I know, did not pursue a comprehensive pro-poor economic program comparable to Thaksinomics.

In other words, while it is good at articulating the masa‘s woes, the Erap-style populist template’s record on actually doing something about those woes is unimpressive at best. ”Its choice of programs,” says Professor David, “betrays a fixation with patronage.” Look at how the Binay dynasty in Makati spends almost a billion a year on frivolous programs like birthday and anniversary cakes for residents and free movie passes for senior citizens, for instance. Moreover, its most glaring defect is its governance: The Estrada years were characterized by the absence of professional and ethical leadership, incompetence, rampant cronyism, and corruption– and all these made it easier for the elite and the middle class to bring President Estrada down in a civilian-military coup in 2001.

This year’s midterm election is a showdown between these two popular leadership templates. The Liberal Party-led coalition is banking on President Benigno S. Aquino III’s moral appeal, while the opposition United Nationalist Alliance (UNA) is banking on President Estrada and Vice President Binay’s populist appeal.

The leaders of UNA know how popular President Aquino is, while the President knows how formidable the support base of President Estrada and, by extension, Vice President Binay, is, too; which is why all three figures are careful not to directly attack one another.

Still, both sides are harping on the differences of each other’s vision. President Aquino and the Liberals are emphasizing the administration’s gains, claiming that inclusive growth is just around the corner, but will be achieved only if the country stays on the Daang Matuwid. The triumvirate of President Estrada, Vice President Binay, and the politically-savvy Senate President Juan Ponce-Enrile, on the other hand, is claiming that the gains of Daang Matuwid are practically meaningless since they are not being felt by the masa.

Finally, the third template is the technocratic leadership brand. This brand projects itself as being more concerned with meeting the challenges of a highly-competitive modern world than the parochial demands of the electorate. Thus, it draws it mandate and political capital from its ability to deliver good results, as opposed to its charismatic appeal or popularity. Two presidents fit this template: Ramos and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

A West Point-educated soldier with a degree in engineering, General Ramos was the first non-politician and non-Catholic to be elected president. He owed his victory in 1992 to the endorsement of the icon of moral leadership, President Corazon Aquino. As president, he reformed the bureaucracy, controlled the restless Armed Forces of the Philippines, pursued peace with Muslim rebels, dismantled monopolies, and opened the economy. Allegations of corruption hound his name to this day, but he is generally regarded as a good president, if not in fact one of the best the Philippines has had.

On the other hand, Macapagal-Arroyo ascended to the presidency after President Estrada’s ouster in 2001, and was re-installed amid massive evidence of fraud in 2004. At first, she projected herself as the successor of President Ramos, hinging her political vehicle Kampi to the General’s political party, Lakas. Well-educated and articulate, she traveled around the world and, speaking in French and in Spanish aside from English, tried to pass herself off as a “modernist leader” of an emerging economy.

To be fair, the economy did recover under her watch, although critics say it did so despite her. Unfortunately, “all her pretensions to modernity collapsed” when, faced with recurrent legitimacy crises, she became a transactional president, stretching the limits of the post-Edsa presidency; corrupting political and social institutions, including the Catholic church; and violating many political taboos, including the declaration of martial law. In the end, her term was marked with kleptocracy and human rights violations reminiscent of the Marcos years.

The emergence of these three leadership templates characterizes the political history of post-Marcos Philippines. The moral leadership of President Corazon Aquino restored democracy, while the technocratic leadership of President Ramos restored stability and revitalized the economy. In an emerging country whose economic growth is uneven and non-inclusive, populism is very attractive, hence President Estrada rose to power in 1998. The mismanagement and corruption of the Estrada years led to the questionable rise of yet another technocratic leader, Macapagal-Arroyo, whose term went out so badly it necessitated the rise of another President Aquino.

In 2016, assuming Secretary Manuel Roxas III is the preferred bet of the ruling Liberal Party regime, the Philippines will see a battle between the technocratic leadership brand and the Erap-style populist brand, whose charges will be led by the formidable Vice President Binay.

If President Aquino is able to consolidate his administration’s gains before he steps down, then perhaps Secretary Roxas will have a chance; but if the masa feels that, once again, they have been left behind, then no one will be able to stop the rise of Binay– for unfortunately, having endured Macapagal-Arroyo for nine years, the masa has become naturally wary of non-charismatic technocratic leaders, which Roxas is.

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Pope Francis: Full of Surprises.

For only the fourth time in the last one hundred years, the maxim “He who enters the conclave a pope leaves it a cardinal” proved true yesterday. An elderly cardinal who had never made it to the papabili lists of all but one Vatican observers, Jorge Mario Bergoglio of Buenos Aires, became Pope Francis.

Everyone is pointing out all of the “firsts” about this new Roman Pontiff– The first pope from Latin America, the first Jesuit pope, and the first pope to take a totally new regnal name– but few are pointing out what seems to be the elephant in the room: That the election of Pope Francis is, in a way, an Italian restoration. And I’m not merely referring to the fact that the Argentine is of Italian descent.

It’s counter-intuitive to think that a Latin American with zero Vatican experience and an acclaimed reputation for frugal living would be the choice of the Italian and Curial blocs in the conclave, but that seems to be the case.

If the Vaticanologists and the Italian press are to be believed, the biggest rift in this conclave had been that between the increasingly activist American bloc and the Italian and Curial groups. The Americans were pushing for an outsider who can reform the Curia in the midst of the fall-out of the Vatileaks scandal and re-energize the faith outside Europe– despite the fact that half of all Catholics live in the Americas, the Church is significantly losing its flock to evangelical churches there because of the Catholic church’s aloofness. The main anti-Curial candidates were said to have been Marc Cardinal Ouellet of Montreal, Timothy Cardinal Dolan of New York, and the enigmatic Sean Patrick Cardinal O’Malley of Boston.

On the other hand, given today’s strong anti-Curial political currents, the Italians knew that by fielding one of their own, the battle would be theirs to lose. Hence they coalesced behind a Latin American who can attract the votes of non-Italian and Third World cardinals. The names that were initially floated were those of Leonardo Cardinal Sandri, an Argentine of Italian descent who serves as Prefect of the Congregation for Oriental Churches, and Odillo Pedro Cardinal Scherrer, a Brazilian of German descent who had served in the Curia but is now the Archbishop of Sao Paolo.

But it seems that, in retrospect, cardinals Sandri and Scherrer were merely distractions whose purpose was to disguise the Curia’s real candidate: the Archbishop of Buenos Aires, who was sheltered from negative publicity by his being off the papabili list.

This is not the first time the Italian Curialists backed the Argentine. In 2005, the Curia reportedly coalesced with the supporters of Milan’s Carlo Maria Cardinal Montini, another Jesuit, in an attempt to block the imminent election of then Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, who was said to have been Pope John Paul II’s henchman against the disgraced head of the Vatican Bank, Archbishop Paul Marcinkus, and, according to Christoph Cardinal Schoenborn, the advocate of a more forceful approach against deviant priests at the height of the sex abuse scandal in the clergy during the latter part of Pope John Paul II’s reign. The irony was that Cardinal Bergoglio, according to the scuttlebutt, had been in fact one of those pushing for Cardinal Ratzinger’s candidacy, at least before “extra omnes” was uttered in the Sistene Chapel.

Why would the Curialists support Cardinal Bergoglio? I think it’s a gamble. They knew they would lose if they insist on an Italian, or on Cardinal Sandri, a Curial insider, and Cardinal Scherrer, who, according to Sandro Magister, is so unpopular his fellow Brazilian bishops rejected his candidacy for the presidency of their episcopal conference. Cardinal Bergoglio, being an elderly figure in the College, is popular among all cardinals, including those from the United States, and is thus a winning horse.

The Curia must have calculated that his being an outsider to the Byzantine court in Rome makes it easy for him to be reined in. This can also be said of other outsider candidates like Luis Antonio Cardinal Tagle of Manila, of course; but the difference is that Cardinal Bergoglio is already seventy-six, and would therefore be seen more as a transitional pope, while Cardinal Tagle, who has been described by some in the Vatican as being too progressive, would be pope for around three decades and was therefore too dangerous a gamble for the Curia.

But, just as the odds have been heavily stacked against a Curialist or an Italian being elected pope in the just-concluded conclave, it should be obvious by now that the chances of this Argentine pope being a Curial puppet is slim. The cardinals who knew him had probably known this all along, hence the decisiveness of his election; while the Roman Curia probably found this out only when he took the name Francis. The significance of that regnal name is unmistakable: This elderly pope, like Angelo Guiseppe Roncalli in 1958, will surprise.

Catholic tradition has it that St. Francis of Assissi, the patron of Italy, dreamed of Jesus telling him to rebuild his Church. He is also known for his renunciation of his wealth in favor of a simple and frugal life. Another saint of the same name, the Jesuit Francis Xavier, meanwhile, is known as an evangelizer of distant lands, particularly Asia. By taking the name of Francis, therefore, Bergolgio is sending a signal that he intends to dedicate his papacy to the rebuilding of the Roman Catholic Church, which is fast spinning into irrelevance in these modern times. Like Francis of Assisis, he will put an emphasis on humility and simplicity– everyone is now pointing out how modest his demeanor has been when he greeted the crowd from the balcony of St. Peter’s last night– and, like Francis Xavier, he will set out to evangelize, continuing what Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI calls the New Evangelization.

More significantly, I think Pope Francis has revealed his theological inclination with regard to the Curia during his first urbi et orbi address. It might be too early to say, but by calling himself the bishop of the Church of Rome, which happens to presides over all the other churches, as opposed to just merely Pope, which suggests absolute leadership over all the Church, he might have been hinting that he favors greater collegiality among bishops, something that Cardinal Tagle also advocates. This means that, like Peter who governed in tandem with his fellow apostles, the new pope would govern the Church in tandem with the bishops, something that is possible only with a Curia that is leaner, more loyal, and less powerful.

A leaner papal bureaucracy is of course is in keeping with Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI’s belief that the Roman Curia “must not be like the armor of Saul, which when worn by the young David prevented him from walking.”

The Pope Emeritus and the new Pope are similar in many ways, ruling out concerns that the strange phenomenon of having two popes could lead to a schism. But, while the two are on the same page on doctrinal issues, they have different priorities: The German, a professor and philosopher, has been more concerned about secularism, relativism, and other issues of theology. The Argentine, a pastor, on the other hand, is more concerned about the poor, the marginalized, and the issues of social justice.

Despite his pro-poor reputation and humble demeanor, however, questions naturally abound about the new Pontiff’s character. Some, for instance, are concerned about his his role in the kidnapping of several Jesuit activist priests during the Argentine dictatorship. To be sure, the accounts are conflicting: Detractors say he essentially handed the priests to the dictatorship while supporters say his intercession saved them from the gallows.

But I think the biggest concern should be the fact that his silence in the face of all the abuses committed by the military rulers of Argentina in the 1970s is gravely inconsistent with the vigor with which he has opposed President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s bid to legalize same-sex marriage in Argentina, going to the extent of declaring open war on the President and calling the now Argentine marriage equality law “a machination of the Father of Lies.” It betrays a mind-boggling disconnect and pathetic double-standards typical of many Catholic prelates. It is reminiscent of how many Philippine bishops were silent on, if not in fact complicit in, the kleptocracy during the Arroyo regime, yet have the gall to wantonly slander the proponents of the reproductive health law today.

This, to borrow the words of a young cardinal, is a “triumphalistic, know-it-all attitude” that will not help this Francis rebuild his Church.

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Sabah: Not private property.

The mind, neuroscientists say, operates in a very small subset of the world that its eyes are able to see. This subset forms a restrictive cognitive environment that makes it extremely difficult for the mind to understand the wider world; in other words, a set of biases that makes the mind myopic. This subset is called the Umwelt.

Professor Randy David once wrote that those who live in an Umwelt are, in a way, color-blind– and usually unaware of it.

There is no doubt that the biggest security issue facing both Malaysia and the Philippines, even eclipsing the South China Sea disputes, is the escalating situation in the disputed region of Sabah. And perhaps the biggest bar to a proper resolution of this conflict is the inability of all the actors involved to think beyond their respective umwelten.

There is, for instance, a nationalist Umwelt: a world where advancing the interest of the nation-state, no matter how costly and destabilizing, is the ultimate value. We see this in Malaysians who think that their government’s response to the crisis has been weak and in Filipinos who think that their government’s failure to support the invasion is an act of treason. There is also the historical Umwelt, which insists that events of the past should still be the arbiter of present disputes, despite the fact that realities on the ground have changed. We see this in those who still cling to old titles to claim territories, oblivious to concepts like sovereignty and values like the right to self-determination. Still, there are those who live in an academic Umwelt that sees little value in the modern international system based on nation-states, emphasizing identities that precede modern national boundaries instead.

Even Prime Minister Najib Razak and President Benigno S. Aquino III seem to live in a restrictive Umwelt, too– one that does not compromise the concept of sovereignty or state authority. Prime Minister Najib, for instance, doesn’t seem to fully appreciate the political realities that compel Manila, a government friendly to his, to request access to Sabah on humanitarian grounds. For him, the crisis is strictly a police issue for Malaysia. Similarly, President Aquino doesn’t see the importance of giving the so-called sultan an opportunity to save face. He only sees the Muslim leader’s insubordination.

Resolving the Sabah crisis requires understanding all these umwelten– that is, understanding where the different actors are coming from. We should take note of all the cultural issues involved, and understand and appreciate the history behind the dispute. But, as columnist John Nery said, history can only go so far. At the end of the day, we will have to act in accordance with present realities.

We can of course argue how arbitrary the current national boundaries are, and how older identities are more enduring than modern nationalities. But realistically, these current boundaries and nationalities are here to stay, and the only way to resolve international disputes is through the framework of the current international system, which recognizes these geo-bodies and nationalities, not old kingdoms and identities.

We can also argue all day about the merits of the Sultanate of Sulu’s claim over Sabah, but the following realities will not change:

Firstly, that despite its long history and the Philippine government’s recognition of its importance to the Moro people’s cultural identity, the Sultanate of Sulu is not a juridical entity, much less a sovereign one. It cannot maintain an army, since militias are prohibited under Philippine laws, and it cannot defy the Philippine government and press an international claim by itself.

Secondly, that Sabah is not merely a piece of private property but a territory whose people have been granted the right to self-determination. While the United Nations-sponsored commission that found that the Sabahans desired to federate with Malaysia in 1963 may have been questionable to the Philippine and Indonesian governments then, the fact remains that Sabah has chosen to be part of the Malaya-Singapore-Sarawak federation and that the people of Sabah see themselves today either as Sabahans or Malaysians and not as Filipinos or Sulu subjects.

Thirdly, that historical titles usually mean next to nothing in international law– otherwise, Spain and Portugal should own the world– and that, finally, there is a clear distinction between sovereignty and ownership: the former trumps the latter. And while the Philippines has legislated its sovereignty over Sabah, Malaysia exercises actual sovereignty.

However, despite the inherent weakness of its claim to Sabah, domestic considerations make it extremely difficult, if not in fact impossible, for the Philippines to drop the claim. This is a practical reality that Malaysia should understand, just as Manila understands that Kuala Lumpur will never cede its sovereignty over Sabah.

Similarly, both Malaysia and the Philippines should understand that the Tausugs, the former subjects of the old Sultanate of Sulu, will always see Sabah as part of their homeland. No amount of Philippine admonition or Malaysian crackdown would change this. In this regard, therefore, the nation-state configuration must be flexible enough to accommodate extra-political nuances that are cultural and historical in nature; for given the fact that the Tausugs have historically been a warrior people, any attempt by both states to force their orientation on them will only result in sustained violence. This is why the current crackdown by Malaysia on the Tausugs in Sabah, assuming it is true, is dangerous for Kuala Lumpur– if Prime Minister Najib is not careful, this might become for him what the Jabidah Massacre was to Philippine dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos in the 1970s.

It will be best for both the Philippine and Malaysian governments to break out of their respective umwelten and understand the nuances of the current realities. Good faith between the two Southeast Asian powers is important, as this would create wiggle room for both to end violence in the immediate term and to solve the dispute in the long term. This, not nationalism, is what patriots on both sides should be fanning.

The situation in Sabah is obviously a Malaysian police issue, and there is nothing the Philippines could do but to call on Kuala Lumpur to respond to the Sulu intrusion in a proportionate manner, and to treat Filipinos in Sabah humanely. President Aquino is paying a steep political price domestically for recognizing this. But while he should remain stern towards the self-proclaimed sultan for provoking this crisis, he should also be flexible enough to allow his group a face-saving way to withdraw from Sabah.

On the other hand, while it is understandable for Prime Minister Najib to show his resolve in defending Malaysian sovereignty against the self-styled sultan’s followers, he should also appreciate President Aquino’s political will and help the President minimize the flak he’s getting from Filipino nationalists. For starters, perhaps he should exercise restraint in deploying the armed forces at his disposal, and grant Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario’s request to send a Philippine humanitarian team to assist the Tausugs in Sabah.

It would be unfortunate if the Prime Minister would exploit the situation to strengthen the Barisan Nasional’s position ahead of the coming general elections in June at the expense of the Philippines. That would be a myopic path that could lead to long-term instability in the Sabah-Sulu corridor, something that would not be in the interest not only of Malaysia and the Philippines but also of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in general.

Finally, once the fighting has subsided, the Philippines and Malaysia should pro-actively seek ways to prevent similar incidents from happening in the future. Perhaps Secretary del Rosario and Foreign Minister Anifah Aman should meet and issue a joint communique expressing their intention to, once and for all, put a closure to the Sabah dispute. Perhaps a joint exploratory committee should be formed to determine a framework on how both countries can address all issues concerned, leading to a final treaty on the Sabah dispute that would address the grievances of the heirs of the Sultanate without violating the Sabahans’ right to self-determination.

I’m sure there are sober, creative minds among Filipinos, Malaysians, and Sabahans that can come up with a win-win solution. I myself have some vague ideas, but I’ll keep them to myself for now.

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HABEMUS PAPAM? Dominum Aloysius Antonius Sanctae Romanae Eclessiae Cardinalem Tagle

Predicting the outcome of a conclave is like predicting who would sit in China’s Politburo during Beijing’s leadership transition. It’s purely speculative, since it’s almost impossible to determine what’s on the cardinal-electors’ mind. As in all political events, however, an educated speculation is possible if all variables are carefully examined.

For instance, while the election of Karol Cardinal Wojtyla in the second conclave of 1978 had been very surprising to most; it was, in retrospect, not that improbable. At that time, there had been a bitter battle between the reactionary clerics, led by Guiseppe Cardinal Siri, and the liberals, led by Giovanni Cardinal Benelli. This bitter rift ensured that there would have been a gridlock, since neither of the blocs could have attained the required two-thirds majority, and that a compromise candidate would have had to be found.

Cardinal Wojtyla was not very well-known outside Poland then, but he had been widely-respected by cardinals and prelates in Rome and elsewhere. A philosopher and charismatic pastor, he had been a rising star in the Church who had gained attention in Synods of Bishops and in several speaking engagements, particularly in the United States. Pope Paul VI even asked him to deliver the papal Lenten retreat in 1976. Vaticanologists should have considered him a papabili then, but they assumed that a non-Italian cardinal had little or no chance.

This blog was among the first, if not in fact the first, to point out that the popular Archbishop of Manila, Luis Antonio Cardinal Tagle, could become the first Filipino papabili. Well, almost all Vatican observers– from the relatively liberal American John Allen to conservative Italians Andrea Tornelli and Sandro Magister– now agree that the Cardinal is indeed a papabile in this year’s conclave. But how big, or slim, are his chances?

In many ways, the coming conclave is similar to the one that elected Cardinal Wojtyla. As in 1978, the conclave this year is completely unexpected, and there is no clear favorite to succeed Pope Benedict XVI, just a myriad of papabiles. Cardinal Tagle, too, is in many ways very similar to John Paul II. Like Cardinal Wojtyla, the Filipino archbishop is a rising star who has a serious reputation as a heavy-weight thinker and a charismatic pastor. Like the Pole, he gained fame for his performances in Synods of Bishops and in several speaking engagements, most notably his electrifying performance at the International Eucharistic Congress in Canada back in 2008.

There are several variables that must be considered in analyzing a conclave. The first of these would be the alignment of coalitions within the Church in general and the College of Cardinals in particular.

Pope Benedict XVI’s reign is in many ways a continuation of the Wojtyla regime. As Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, the present pope had been the doctrinal enforcer of Pope John Paul II and is bent on preserving the Pole’s theological legacy, which is relatively conservative. Most of the cardinals are part of this Wojtyla-Ratzinger coalition. Even within the Wojtyla-Ratzinger coalition, however, there seems to have been a lot of rifts and confrontations, most notably on the issues of the Pope’s attempt to reform the Vatican’s financial system and the sexual abuse scandal.

There have been reports that a conservative coalition led by the Secretary of State, Tarcisio Cardinal Bertone, and his predecessor, Angelo Cardinal Sodano, has been at odds with the Pope himself on how to handle the sexual abuse scandal. Pope Benedict XVI’s long-time student and assiduous “campaign manager” in the 2005 conclave, Archbishop Christoph Cardinal Schonborn of Vienna, for instance, has even publicly castigated Cardinal Sodano for dismissing the abuse scandal as mere rumors. The Pope, said Cardinal Schonborn, had wanted to deal with the abusive priests aggressively when he was still Cardinal Ratzinger, but cardinals Bertone and Sodano, who seem to have the entire Curia behind them, undermined him. The Austrian also alleged that Cardinal Sodano, as John Paul II’s Secretary of State, protected his disgraced predecessor, Hans Hermann Cardinal Groer, who had been accused of molesting seminarians.

Cardinal Schonborn had since been gagged by Rome and his comments has led to the unofficial promulgation of the so-called Sodano Rule, which prohibits cardinals from publicly criticizing their fellow cardinals. The Sodano Rule, however, did not apply to Archbishop Jose Horacio Gomez of Los Angeles, who publicly censured his predecessor, Archbishop Emeritus Roger Cardinal Mahony, for coddling sexual offenders.

Another issue that divides Rome is the allegedly growing influence of Cardinal Bertone, who had been the target of the Vatileaks scandal. Critics say that he has been abusing his influence as the papal prime minister, undermining the Pope, who in turn had been too busy with his theological writings he has neglected his duty as Rome’s foremost administrator. Cardinal Bertone, for instance, is widely believed to have been behind the first consistory of 2012, which created twenty-two cardinals from Europe, dramatically altering the demographics of the College of Cardinals in favor of Italy and reversing the trend of internationalizing the College, ostensibly to pave the way for an Italian restoration in the papacy. Pope Benedict XVI tried to reverse him by calling for a surprise second consistory, the star of which, most agreed, had been Cardinal Tagle.

Another variable that must be considered is the crossroads in which the Church finds itself at the moment of the conclave. The challenges facing the Church would certainly affect the opinion of the cardinal-electors on the qualities the next pope should have.

For instance, the cardinal-electors picked Cardinal Ratzinger in 2005 partly because he was seen as the only person with the gravitas to fill the big shoes left behind by John Paul II. But more importantly, while there had been widespread talk then of a non-European pope– some say that Archbishop Jorge Cardinal Bergoglio of Buenos Aires placed second to Cardinal Ratzinger in that year’s conclave– at that time, as in now, the Church’s biggest concern was the rising tide of secularism and the erosion of Christian cultural identity in its  own backyard, hence the need for a pope who knows Europe inside out (and true enough, most of Benedict XVI’s trips throughout his papacy have been in Europe).

Things are not much different this time around. The Catholic Church is still losing ground to secular forces in the West, and it needs someone who can continue Pope Benedict XVI’s drive to win it back. Aside from tackling issues like the clerical sex abuse scandal, engaging the secular world and leading the so-called New Evangelization, which was widely discussed in the Synod of Bishops last year, are seen to be important. Therefore, perhaps the cardinals would look for someone capable of doing either, or both, of these.

The third variable would be demographics. The composition of the College of Cardinals definitely affects how it votes. The overwhelming majority of the cardinals have been appointed by Pope Benedict XVI, although some may insinuate that many in this majority can perhaps be characterized more as Bertone babies rather than Ratzinger fans.

The biggest bloc comprises the Italians, who form around 17% of the total vote. The Americans, with 11 votes, are the second biggest national bloc. In terms of continents, Europe has 62 votes, Latin Americans has 15, Africa and Asia have 11 each, while Oceania has one.

As many in the media have already pointed out, many among the cardinals should already be exchanging views with each other, and looking up some of the candidates’ profiles, by now. Cardinals who have had their moments in the spotlight, and those who have had regular correspondences with their fellow electors, have an obvious advantage. Media reports, both from the secular press and the Vaticanologists, are probably a factor, too.

Of course, how each cardinals vote would not be affected solely by geography. Who they interact with will also determine their views on what qualities the next pope should have. In this respect, we can say that perhaps many of the Italians look to cardinals Bertone and Sodano for guidance, although they won’t necessarily vote as a bloc. The Latin American group is also less likely to vote as a bloc, since it has among its midst many cardinals capable of wielding influence, which means no one cardinal can be a unifying force for the group. The same is true with the Africans. Perhaps the Americans, led by their primate, President of the American Bishop’s Conference Timothy Cardinal Dolan, would be more inclined to vote as a group. In Asia, meanwhile, Cardinal Tagle is no doubt the primus inter pares, although the counsel of the elder electors, like Australia’s George Cardinal Pell, would probably be sought as well. In short, the fourth variable to watch are the potential king-makers among the cardinals.

Currently, cardinals Angelo Scola and Dionigi Tettamazi appear to be the candidates leading the charge for an Italian restoration. They will be seen as candidates of the Bertone-Sodano coalition, which favors continuing the Church’s policy on the sexual abuse scandal, among others. Cardinal Schonborn, another papabili, would be the opposition to that coalition, and will favor stronger sanctions against erring priests.

Cardinal Schonborn’s advantage is that he is seen as the continuation of the Wojtyla-Ratzinger regime. However, his public remarks against Cardinal Sodano, which was rebuffed by Rome itself, along with the rebellion of priests he is facing in Vienna, are a bane to his candidacy. At best, we can probably relegate the Austrian cardinal to the role of king-maker.

If it’s true that there’s a rift between the Bertone-Sodano clique and those who think like Cardinal Schonborn, then there would probably be a need for a compromise candidate to emerge. Gianfranco Cardinal Ravasi comes to mind.

Cardinal Ravasi’s role as the President of the Pontifical Council for Culture, where he tried to constructively engage the secular world, including the agnostics and atheists, has gained attention. While the Church is just beginning to learn how to engage the youth through social media, the Cardinal already tweets to tens of thousands of followers. He also led the papal Lenten retreat this year, a sign that he might have Pope Benedict XVI’s nod– the previous two popes were chosen to lead the retreat prior to their elections, too.

Reports that Cardinal Ravasi is a vain man, however, might not sit well with some cardinals. Similarly, his being an Italian could be a bane, especially if enough voices in the conclave clamor for a non-Italian, or even a non-European, pope. If that’s the case, then the most viable candidate would be Canada’s Marc Cardinal Ouellet.

I’ve argued on Twitter that if the next pope would not be an Italian, then he will most likely be Canadian. Cardinal Ouellet has worked in the Curia long enough to be considered by the Italians as one of them, but still obviously not an Italian for everyone else. He has, willingly or unwillingly, developed a formidable power base as Prefect of the Congregation for Bishops, which selects candidates to be archbishops and bishops all over the world. Demographics works well for him too, since he has cultivated intimate relationships with Latin American cardinals as President of the Pontifical Commission for Latin America. In other words, not only is he amenable to the Italians because of his Curial background, he could easily secure the support of the North American bloc, which has 14 votes, and the South American bloc, which has 13, too.

So, where is Cardinal Tagle in all these scheme of things? Unfortunately, his chances are very slim; but, then again, so were Cardinal Wojtyla’s in 1978.

Cardinal Tagle’s biggest disadvantage, it has often been said, is that he is the youngest among the Latin rite cardinal-electors and one of the six most junior members of the College. But this attribute could in fact be turned into an advantage.

Pope Benedict XVI’s resignation due to his advanced age may prod the cardinals to seek a younger and more energetic pope. There is, of course, a concern that electing a young pope would lead to a papacy that is too long; but, as Magister has pointed out, Benedict XVI’s precedent, which makes resignation an option for future popes, mitigates this. Moreover, there might be those in the College who feel nostalgic about John Paul II’s pontificate and would want to elect a charismatic pastor with a photogenic smile. It’s hard to find a cardinal now who’s more charismatic and photogenic than Tagle.

Moreover, as one of the leaders of the Synod of Bishop last year that drafted the Vatican’s policy of New Evangelization, Cardinal Tagle can be seen not only as a charismatic pastor who can lead the Church into the new world dominated by social media, but also a high-caliber thinker who knows where the Church is in the midst of growing secularism and where it should go.

Polish priest Mieczyslaw Melinski, a friend of then Cardinal Wojtyla, once argued with the future pope that he would be elected in the 1978 conclave, which the then Polish cardinal naturally laughed off. But the priest’s arguments then were telling: Noting that the time had come for a non-Italian pope, he said, “the Archbishop of Krakow is not a bureaucrat, but a pastor and an intellectual who became known during the Council and then during the Synods of Bishops. You’ll be the next Pope!” He could have been talking to the Archbishop of Manila.

But there is one difference between Tagle and Wojtyla. The Polish cardinal was seen in 1978 as an acceptable compromise candidate because he was seen to be neither too liberal nor too conservative. Cardinal Tagle, on the other hand, has strong progressive credentials. His connections with the School of Bologna, a group known for its liberal interpretation of the Second Vatican Council– I argued on this blog last year that this had been the reason he was bypassed in the first consistory of 2012– have been a source of controversy, something that the eminent Filipino theologian, Father Catalino Arevalo, dismissed as merely a politically-motivated attempt by some in Rome to paint the Filipino as a “super-ultraliberal,” when in fact Tagle and Ratzinger have pretty much the same theological views.

In numerous Synods, Cardinal Tagle was unafraid to speak out on issues such as the shortage of priest, which was the premise of his call for the Church to debate celibacy. He also pointed out the need for the Church to address not only the issues of child abuse scandal, but also of priests who keep mistresses, particularly in the Philippines. Finally, in the last Synod, he called for a “humble, listening Church,” saying that the Catholic Church is turning people off because of its arrogant, “know-it-all attitude.” These could endear Cardinal Tagle to those who understand where he is coming from, but alienate him from those who are still conservative, if not in fact reactionary, in their orientation.

Magister’s recent praises for the Filipino cardinal, however, could balance this. Magister, the one Vaticanologist whom Italian cardinals do read, criticized Tagle’s elevation to Manila in 2011, but is now singing a different tune. He now says that the Cardinal, the only viable Third World papabili, is very balanced in his theological orientation and has the confidence of the Pope himself.

Indeed, Pope Benedict XVI, the patron of the traditionalists, seems to treat the young Filipino as a protege of sorts. Some even say the surprise consistory last year was done precisely because the Pope had wanted the Archbishop of Manila to be in the College before his abdication. Like cardinals Schonborn and Ravasi, therefore, Cardinal Tagle may be seen to be enjoying the esteem of the departing pope.

But I suspect that Cardinal Tagle’s candidacy could only be seriously considered if, like Cardinal Wojtyla’s candidacy in 1978, someone in the College, a king-maker if you will, pushes hard for it. In 1978, Franz Cardinal Koenig of Austria pushed for Cardinal Wojtyla as an alternative to cardinals Siri and Benelli, personally talking with individual cardinals to convince them that the Pole was the right guy. Cardinal Wojtyla was already well-known among the cardinals then, but it was Cardinal Koenig’s maneuvers that truly propelled him to front-runner status during the conclave.

This time around, the potential king-makers are Cardinal Dolan, who leads 11 American cardinal-electors and could therefore swing the vote for a particular candidate, assuming he is not himself in the running;  Cardinal Schonborn, who would probably look for a candidate who subscribes to Pope Benedict XVI’s legacy but is not part of the Bertone-Sodano axis; and Cardinal Ouellet, the front-runner himself, who could, as we’ve mentioned above, influence a large number of cardinals across different continents. Cardinal Ouellet, it should be noted, was quick to come to Cardinal Tagle’s defense when Magister criticized him for his connections with the Bologna school.

But would anyone of these king-maker throw his support behind the Cardinal from Asia? For now, it’s anyone’s guess.

UPDATE, MARCH 12: Based on reports in the Italian press, the biggest cleavage in this year’s conclave seems to be emerging between the Americans and the Italians.

The Americans, the second-biggest national bloc in the College of Cardinals, have been holding a daily joint press briefing, which had enraged the traditionalists so much the Roman Curia issued a gag order. The US cardinals are said to be pushing for a papacy that is not beholden to the Curia, and are fielding two of their own, Timothy Cardinal Dolan of New York and Sean Patrick Cardinal O’Malley of Boston. Their third choice is said to be Marc Cardinal Ouellet of Montreal.

Meanwhile, the Curial cardinals and the Italian bloc, knowing that they would lose if they field an Italian, is rallying behind Brazil’s Odillo Cardinal Scherrer. Cardinal Scherrer might attract the naive Third World cardinals who would see him as one of them, but the Brazillian is a Curial insider; perhaps as Italian as Joseph Ratzinger. The problem is that, according to Magister, he is not even popular in Brazil– the bishops there allegedly rejected his candidacy for presidency of their conference.

UPDATE, MARCH 15: Jorge Mario Cardinal Bergoglio, the Archbishop of Buenos Aires, has been elected Pope Francis. Here’s my thoughts on his election.

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