All eyes are on Cairo now as two of the country’s presidential candidates, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammad Morsi and former Mubarak prime minister Ahmed Shafiq, have simultaneously declared victory in yesterday’s presidential polls. But whoever wins the presidency, Egypt would likely remain under military rule.
The election is arguably the culmination of the decades-old war between the Islamist Brotherhood and the military clique, which has been ruling the country through the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces since Mubarak’s ouster last year. For all intents and purposes, the two institutions represents the only credible power poles in Egypt: The military, aside from being the guarantor of the nation’s security and political stability, controls a substantial portion of the Egyptian economy. The Brotherhood, on the other hand, has a formidable grassroots support that makes it the only credible threat to the military’s political power.
Between the two, the military has the obvious upper hand. Having hi-jacked last year’s people power revolt through a silent coup, the generals of the Council have been dictating the terms of the post-Mubarak transition. Through the whole machinery of the government, the ruling generals appear to be moving mountains to ensure General Shafiq’s victory. But even if the former Air Force Marshall fails to win, the Council can still retain power by making the Brotherhood’s candidate a lameduck president.
Earlier, the ruling generals had the Parliament dissolved by the Supreme Constitution Court on technical grounds. The said Parliament had been writing a constitution, which would have defined the powers of the president vis a vis the Council. But now that the Parliament has been dissolved, legislative powers has reverted back to the Council, which means that the Council will now be the one to define the powers of whoever would be elected as president. If the Islamist Morsi becomes president, the Council would certainly make his office practically toothless.
As if these are not insurance enough, a case has been filed before the Supreme Constitution Court questioning the legality of the Brotherhood itself.
As I see it, therefore, the Brotherhood’s only options now are either to cut a power-sharing deal with the Council or to mobilize massive street protests. But I suspect that any protest actions would likely fizzle out since the Brotherhood has reportedly lost some public support following concerns about its reckless introduction of Islamist bills in the previous Parliament. Moreover, the Justice Ministry has recently declared that military and intelligence officers could again arrest civilians, hinting that the Council is willing to flex some muscles in order to nip massive protest actions in the bud.
Cutting a deal with the ruling generals, meanwhile, would be a pragmatic option, but it would not yield much tactical advantage. The Islamists would have to negotiate from a position of weakness, which means that the Council– unless prodded by the United States, which is unlikely at this point– would only allow few concessions to the Brotherhood, if at all. Moreover, cozying up to the generals might alienate the conservatives among the Brotherhood’s ranks.
In short, more than a year after risking their lives in a people power revolt in Tahrir Square, the Egyptians will now have an empowered military clique ruling alongside a toothless president and without a parliament. This arrangement will likely stall, or even reverse, the country’s democratic transition; but it will also guarantee a predictable regime that would maintain whatever is left of Egypt’s, and the entire region’s, stability.